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Abstract 
The paper presents a simple model arguing that the pecking order theory is an extreme 
when there is only asymmetric information about value. We show how asymmetric 
information about both, value and risk, transforms the adverse selection logic underlying 
the pecking order into a general theory of capital structure that accounts for both debt and 
equity issues. The model predicts that firms issue more equity and less debt if there is 
more asymmetric information about risk relative to value. We find robust empirical 
support for the prediction and document a strong link between risk and capital structure 
in a large unbalanced panel of publicly traded US firms from 1971 to 2001. 
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The pecking order theory of capital structure, one of the most influential theories of 
corporate leverage, has recently fallen on hard times. On the one hand, the theory has 
considerable intuitive appeal. Firms seeking outside finance naturally face an adverse 
selection and hence mispricing problem. In order to avoid mispricing, firms finance 
investments internally if they can and if they cannot they prefer debt to equity since debt 
is less sensitive to outside investors not knowing the value of firms’ investment projects 
(Myers and Majluf (1984)). On the other hand, the pecking order seems to work well 
when it should not and seems to not work well when it should. Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) show that the pecking order is a good first order description for the time series of 
debt finance for large mature firms. But these firms should face little asymmetric 
information in capital markets. The pecking order cannot explain why young, small, non-
dividend paying firms, i.e. firms that should face large asymmetric information problems, 
issue equity (Graham and Harvey (2001), Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal 
(2003)) 
This paper argues that the original pecking order is an extreme when there is only 
asymmetric information about value. We illustrate how considering asymmetric 
information about both, value and risk, transforms the adverse selection logic into a 
theory of debt and equity. The main prediction is that firms issue more equity and less 
debt if there is more asymmetric information about risk relative to value. We find strong 
and robust support for the prediction in a large unbalance sample of publicly traded firms 
from the Compustat database. 
The intuition for our result is best seen considering two extremes. Suppose first that there 
is only asymmetric information about the value of a firm’s investment opportunity. Since 
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the value of debt is independent of not knowing the value of an investment, we have the 
standard pecking order. Alternatively, suppose that there is only asymmetric information 
about the risk of an investment opportunity. Now the value of equity is independent of 
not knowing risk so that we have a reverse pecking order.1 It is therefore natural to expect 
to have a general theory of debt and equity in between the two extremes. To see the 
intuition for the general theory in more detail, consider what happens if riskier projects 
are also more valuable. Pure equity does not avoid mispricing since equity from riskier 
(and more valuable) firms is more valuable than equity from safer (and less valuable) 
firms. In order to reduce the incentive for riskier firms to sell overpriced equity, investors 
require that some debt must be issued too. Debt from riskier firms is less valuable which 
reduces riskier firms’ incentive to sell overpriced securities. Adding debt therefore 
reestablishes outside investors’ indifference to not knowing the value and risk of firms’ 
investment opportunities. 
We follow the empirical strategy of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and 
Goyal (2003) who propose to test the standard pecking using a pooled panel regression of 
changes in debt on the financing deficit. The argument is that the original pecking order 
predicts that firms issue debt whenever their internal cash flows are insufficient to 
finance real investments (and other uses of funds such as dividends). The financing 
deficit, i.e. uses of funds minus internal sources of funds, therefore drives debt issuance. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that the support for the standard pecking order in Shyam-
Sunder and Myers depends critically on their sample selection. Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
consider only 157 firms that have no reporting gaps in their statement of cash-flows from 
1971 to1989. Frank and Goyal show that the results do not extent to an unbalanced 
                                                 
1 The possibility of a reverse pecking order is mentioned informally in Myers and Majluf (1984). 
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sample, i.e. when reporting gaps are allowed, and to the time period from 1990 to 1998. 
Frank and Goyal argue that the sample selection of Shyam-Sunder and Myers picks large 
mature firms and that the standard pecking order is not a good description of the capital 
structure decisions for the small, young firms in their larger sample. 
Fama and French (2002) test the pecking order and compare it to the main alternative: the 
trade-off theory. They find that on the one hand that “the pecking order model beats the 
trade-off model: more profitable firms have less book leverage”. But on the other hand, 
they state a little further that “the less levered nonpayers [of dividends] are typically 
small growth firms” and that “the least-levered nonpayers make large net new issues of 
stock […], even though they appear to have low-risk debt capacity. This is not proper 
pecking order behavior.”2 
The survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) also finds mixed support. CFOs attach 
importance to avoid issuing undervalued securities, which is in line with the adverse 
selection logic of the pecking order, but at the same time they do not find evidence that 
small firms and dividends payers, i.e. firms that should face a lot of asymmetric 
information in external capital markets, follow the standard pecking order by preferring 
debt to equity. 
Our theory of debt and equity explains this empirical puzzle by arguing that these issuers 
of equity, i.e. small, young nonpayers of dividends, face a lot of asymmetric information 
about risk relative to value. We test this claim by ranking firms in deciles according to 
their past volatility of the market value of assets. The argument is that an investor worries 
a lot more about not knowing the risk relative to the value of an investment if the firm 
                                                 
2 This controvery sparked recent research that attempts to combine the standard pecking order and the 
trade-off theory empirically (Lemmon and Zender (2002), Mayer and Sussman (2002) and Hovikimian et 
al. (2003)). 
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that approaches him has had volatile assets in the recent past. Our variable is a more 
precise proxy for risk than size (Fama and French (2002)) or the volatility of earnings 
(Titman and Wessels (1988)). 
The combination of a risk augmented adverse selection logic of capital structure and a 
precise measure of risk allows us, to document for the first time (to our knowledge) a 
convincing impact of risk on capital structure.3 
We confirm the robustness of our results in a number of ways. First of all, we test a series 
of hypothesis. If our model is misspecified and/or if our theory is wrong (by arguing for 
example that equity is issued because firms run out of debt capacity or to time the market 
as in Baker and Wurgler (2002)), we argue that it would be very difficult to reconcile 
theory and evidence as consistently as we do with our (now supposedly wrong) model. 
Other robustness checks include testing for the correlation of residuals across firms and 
time, including the set of conventional leverage variables of Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
considering different time periods and using other controls for risk. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the theoretical model of a 
general adverse selection theory of debt and equity. It also describes the empirical 
hypotheses that we derive from the theory and how we propose to test them. Section 2 
describes our sample, the construction of our past asset risk variable and presents some 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 contains the main empirical results. Their robustness is 
verified in section 4 and section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
3 The survey by Harris and Raviv (1991) shows mixed evidence when linking leverage to volatility. The 
comprehensive study of leverage by Rajan and Zingales (1995) does not focus on volatility since they 
argue that there are too few observations available to construct meaningful measures of volatility. 
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Theory 
The model is a simplified version of Heider (2003). It analyzes a firm that needs to raise 
outside financing in order to undertake a profitable investment project. The capital 
structure decision is subject to an adverse selection problem since outside investors know 
less about the characteristics of the investment project than firm insiders. The model 
allows comparative statics on project characteristics. In other words, we will vary the 
extent to which outside investors do not know (or care about) project “risk” relative to 
“value”. 
The model 
Each firm has access to a single project that needs financing I. If undertaken, the project 
either succeeds or fails. There are many project types indexed by θ. If it succeeds it 
returns ( ) ( )σ θ µ θ , if it fails, it returns nothing. The probability of success is1/ ( )σ θ . The 
mean of a project therefore is ( )µ θ  and its variance is 2( ) ( ( ) 1)µ θ σ θ − . Both σ and µ are 
positive functions of the project type θ, σ’>0 and µ’>0. If µ’ is large and σ’ is small, then 
projects vary a lot in means but not in variances and vice versa. We therefore interpret 
( )µ θ  as a measure of “value” and ( )σ θ  as a measure of “risk”. Alternatively, one can 
think of a project with a high ( )σ θ  as a “growth” project, i.e. a project that succeeds 
rarely but if it does, its return is large.4 
                                                 
4 The analysis here is only an example using a mean-variance framework. We now from Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1970) that the mean-variance framework is useful but not always precise. The more general 
analysis in Heider (2003) therefore uses more precise notions of “risk” and “value” such a stochastic 
dominance and mean-preserving spreads. The criticism that with a two point distribution there is no 
difference between debt and equity does not apply here since every type θ has a different return ( ) ( )σ θ µ θ . 
For example, with just two types A and B, both a debt and equity are defined over 3 possible returns (0, xA, 
xB). 
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A firm has no funds available so that the entire investment outlay I is raised from a 
competitive capital market by issuing a mix of debt and equity.5 Debt is a zero-coupon 
bond with face value F and equity gives outsider an α % stake in the firm. The expected 
value of a combination of debt and equity (F(θ), α(θ)) that finances a project θ is: 
 1 [ ( ) ( )( ( ) ( ) ( ))]
( )
V F Fθ α θ σ θ µ θ θ
σ θ
= + −  (1) 
A project θ succeeds with probability 1/ ( )σ θ . In that case its return ( ) ( )σ θ µ θ  is used to 
repay the debt F. The equity part α is a claim on the project after the debt has be repaid, 
( ) ( )σ θ µ θ -F. When the project fails, both debt and equity are worthless.6 
The key distortion is that an outside investor does not know what kind of project he is 
financing. He is therefore exposed to an adverse selection, or mispricing, problem. To 
illustrate this, consider the marginal rate of substitution of debt for equity of the expected 
value of a combination of debt and equity: 
 ,
/ ( ) ( )
/ 1F
V FMRS
V Fα
α σ θ µ θ
α
∂ ∂ −
= − = −
∂ ∂ −
 (2) 
The marginal rate of substitution decreases in the project type θ. To make up for a given 
reduction of debt, the investor requires less equity from a firm with a high θ project. In 
other words, a firm with a more “valuable” or “riskier” project has equity that is worth 
more. This is intuitive given that levered equity is proportional to and convex in the 
underlying value of the project. An adverse selection problem arises when outside 
investors do not know the characteristics of an investment project. A firm with a low θ 
                                                 
5 The amount I therefore represents an investment need after internal sources of funds have been exhausted. 
6 The analysis can be extended to allow for inside cash, a positive pay-off when the project fails and assets-
in place (see Heider (2003)). The key element is that the debt must not be 100% safe. Safe debt trivially 
solves the adverse selection problem of outside finance. 
 - 7 - 
project, i.e. a safe or not so valuable project, has an incentive to issue overpriced equity. 
The “value” part is the part that motivated the original pecking order of Myers and 
Majluf (1984). Heider (2003) adds the “risk” part to the adverse selection problem of 
financing. 
To solve the adverse selection problem, we ask the following natural question: are there 
combinations of debt and equity for which the investor does not care not being informed? 
Moreover, we ask: how do these belief-independent combinations of debt and equity 
depend on not knowing value relative to risk? 
We formalize these questions as follows. Not knowing the characteristics of an 
investment project, an investor forms the expectation across possible project types θ in 
order to figure out how profitable the financing (F(θ),α(θ)) is going to be: 
 θθθθµθσθαθ
θσ
dfFF )())]()()()(()([
)(
1
∫ −+  (3) 
The density f(θ) describes an investor’s belief that a project of type θ is being financed 
with a combination of debt and equity, (F(θ),α(θ)). The question then is: is there a 
combination of debt and equity that, if used for all project types, makes beliefs irrelevant? 
That is, we look for the belief-independent combination of debt and equity ( , )F α  such 
that: 
 0)()])()(([
)(
1
=−+
∂
∂
∫ θθθµθσαθσ
dfFF
f
 (4) 
Or simply, 
 CFF =−+ )])()(([
)(
1 θµθσα
θσ
 (5) 
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where C is an arbitrary constant. A combination of debt and equity that gives the same 
pay-off for every project type θ is clearly belief-independent. 
To see how the belief-independent combination of debt and equity changes as we change 
the degree to which outside investors do not know the “value” and/or “risk” of 
investment projects, we take the derivative with respect to θ on both sides of (5): 
 ' (1 ) 'Fαµ α σ= −  (6) 
Equation (6) is the central result of the model. If projects do not vary in risk, 0'=σ , so 
that investors are trivially uninformed about value only, the belief-independent financing 
contract is pure debt, 0=α . This is the essence of the original pecking order of Myers 
and Majluf (1984). It is an extreme: debt is robust to the adverse selection problem of 
financing if outside investors do not know the value, or do not care about the risk, of 
investment projects. 7 The other extreme is that equity is the robust security when 
investment projects differ only in risk, i.e. 0=F  when 0'=µ . This is the reverse 
pecking order. 
To see the comparative statics in between the two extremes, i.e. when projects differ in 
both risk and value, more clearly, we write (6) as: 
 ' 1
'
r Fµ α
σ α
−
= =  (7) 
The left hand side of (7) decreases if σ’ increases and/or µ’ decreases. If investors worry 
more about not knowing the risk relative to the value of investment projects, the capital 
                                                 
7 The analysis in Myers and Majluf (1984) i) only considered safe investment projects and ii) only 
illustrated the adverse selection problem of equity finance. Nachman and Noe (1994) show that pure debt 
finance is optimal when risky investments can be ordered according to conditional first-order stochastic 
dominance (which corresponds to σ’=0 in our case). Asset A dominates asset B by first-order stochastic 
dominance iff non-satiated investors prefer asset A to asset B. The interpretation is that asset A is more 
“valuable” than asset B or that investors who care mostly about value (and not risk) prefer asset A to asset 
B. 
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structure that is robust to the adverse selection problem of outside financing involves 
more equity and less debt. 
To see the intuition, suppose that investment returns are identical across projects except 
for random noise, i.e. investments differ only in pure risk. Then investors do not care 
about being imperfectly informed (about risk) if they hold pure equity, i.e. a linear claim. 
This does not work if investments with a bigger noise also have a higher expected return 
(now investors also do not know the value of a project). With pure equity, all investors 
wish they had financed those riskier but more valuable projects. In order to “tilt the 
balance back'', some debt must be issued too. The claim is then more concave (from the 
investors' point of view), i.e. it subtracts value if the investment is riskier, and investors 
are again indifferent about which kind of investment they finance. Depending on what 
investors do not know (or care about), we therefore arrive at a theory of leverage based 
on asymmetric information. As risk becomes more important, the contract that makes 
investors ''immune'' to adverse selection needs to be less concave, i.e. involve more 
equity. 
Empirical hypothesis and testing 
We follow Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) who test the 
standard pecking order using a pooled panel regression of net long-term debt issues ∆D 
on the financing deficit DEF: 
 ititit bDEFaD ε++=∆  (8) 
The deficit DEF is an aggregation of a firm i’s uses of funds at time t minus its cash flow 
at the same period: 
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 ititititititit EDCWIDIVDEF ∆+∆=−∆++=  (9) 
Note that (9) is an accounting identity. The deficit must be externally financed, either 
with debt ∆D or with equity ∆E. 
The specification (8) captures the basic idea of the standard pecking order that a firm 
issues debt if its internal cash flow C is insufficient to cover its uses of funds: real 
investment I, dividends DIV and changes in working capital ∆W). According to the 
standard pecking order, equity is only issued as a last resort. If the standard pecking order 
was the only true determinant of capital structure, then one expects a=0 and b=1. 
Although the hypothesis b=1 is statistically rejected, Shyam-Sunder and Myers estimate 
b to be 0.75 and they show that the pecking order in their sample of 157 firms without a 
reporting gap from 1970 to 1989 is a good first order approximation (in the sense of 
having statistical power) of the time series of debt financing. 
Our model however suggests that the standard pecking order is an extreme and that it 
should not work well for a broader sample of firms. Indeed, we replicate Frank and 
Goyal’s finding that the result in Shyam-Sunder and Myers does not hold on a broader 
sample of firms. Frank and Goyal argue is that Shyam-Sunder and Myers introduce a 
selection bias by considering only a small number of firm that report continuously the 
necessary variables for the entire time period from 1971 to 1989. Our argument however 
is that there is no reason to expect the standard pecking order to work well for all firms. It 
should only work well when uninformed investors worry mostly about not knowing the 
value but not the risk of firms’ investments. 
We saw in the model that firms issue more debt relative to equity when the ratio 
describing the nature of asymmetric information r=µ’/σ’ is high. But what is a good 
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empirical proxy for the nature of asymmetric information? The main empirical 
innovation of this paper is to use a firm’s past asset volatility to proxy for the nature of 
asymmetric information. We argue that uninformed investors think differently about a 
firm that approaches them for financing if its market value of assets has been volatile or 
stable in the recent past. If a firm had market value of assets that was not volatile 
recently, then outside investors do not worry much about not knowing the risk of the 
firm’s investment opportunity. Instead, they worry mostly about its value. If on the 
contrary the market value of assets has been volatile, then uninformed investors also care 
a lot about not knowing the risk of an investment. We therefore argue that last year’s 
asset volatility proxies for 1/r. 
To control for a firm’s past asset risk, we sort firms each year into deciles according to 
their asset risk in the previous year. We then run the standard pecking order regression 
(8) in each decile and compare the intercept, the coefficient on the financing deficit and 
its explanatory power across risk deciles. 
Our result that the standard pecking order is obtained when σ’=0 translates into the 
following empirical hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The standard pecking order should work well for firms that have the 
lowest asset risk. 
The model also shows that as r decreases, firms issue less debt to overcome the adverse 
selection problem. This is our second empirical hypothesis  
Hypothesis 2a: The standard pecking order should work less and less well for firms with 
higher and higher asset risk. 
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Instead of issuing debt to overcome the adverse selection problem, firms issue more 
equity as r decreases. The model modifies the standard pecking order into a theory of 
leverage, with a reverse pecking order in the extreme when r=0. We therefore have the 
following corollary of hypothesis 2a: 
Hypothesis 2b: A reverse pecking order should work better and better for firms with 
higher and higher asset risk. 
We test hypothesis 2b by running regression (8) with net equity issues as the dependent 
variable: 
 it it itE a bDEF ε∆ = + +  (10) 
Since (9) is an accounting identity, checking whether fitted debt and equity issues from 
(8) and (10) add up to one across risk deciles, ˆ ˆ 1D E∆ + ∆ = , is a useful test of the 
accuracy of our cash-flow data. 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b are central to this study. The standard pecking order of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) cannot explain the issue of equity for a firm in normal operations. It can 
only accommodate equity as a mode of financing of last resort, i.e. firms are supposed to 
issue equity only if they have exhausted all other sources of financing. 
Our theory of capital structure, as well as the standard pecking order, is based on an 
informational friction at the moment when the firm contacts external capital markets. 
Other conventional determinants of leverage such as profits, tangibility or the market to 
book ratio are supposed to be secondary. The following hypothesis formulates an 
important robustness check.  
Hypothesis 3: The pattern in hypothesis 2a and 2b should be independent of other, 
conventional determinants of leverage. 
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To guide us in the selection of other, more conventional determinants of leverage, we 
follow Rajan and Zingales (1995) who have distilled a large body of empirical research 
on the determinants of leverage (for a review see Harris and Raviv (1991)) into a cross-
sectional model with four main variables: profits, sales, tangibility of assets and the 
market to book ratio. 
The conventional wisdom on the traditional leverage variables is that having more 
tangible assets supports debt because it means that firms can collateralize the debt. The 
market-to-book ratio is usually seen as a proxy for growth opportunities which should be 
negatively related to leverage. The argument is that leverage exposes firms to the “debt 
overhang” problem (Myers 1977). A recent alternative explanation of a negative 
relationship is market timing. Firms with a high market-to-book ratio are overvalued and 
hence issue equity to take advantage of overvaluation (Baker and Wurgler (2001)). Sales 
are usually positively associated with leverage. There is no clear theoretical foundation 
but one normally argues that larger firms have a higher reputation or are safer so they can 
borrow more. Profits show up regularly as a negative determinant of leverage. 
Traditionally this has been the strongest empirical challenge for conventional trade-off 
models of leverage (see Titman and Wessels (1988) and Fama and French (2002)). The 
trade-off theory predicts that more profitable firms should issue more debt since they run 
a smaller risk of bankruptcy and have more taxable income to shield. 
The conventional set of variables is used to explain the level of leverage. Our theory 
based on adverse selection however explains changes in leverage. We therefore follow 
Frank and Goyal (2003) and use changes in the conventional determinants of leverage 
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which enables us to include the conventional leverage variables in regression (8) and 
estimate the following model:8  
 it DEF it
TANG it MTB it PROF it LOGSALES it it
D a b DEF
b TANG b MTB b PROF b LOGSALES ε
∆ = +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
 (11) 
We can then test our hypothesis 3 by asking whether the inclusion of traditional leverage 
variables alters the coefficient on the financing deficit bDEF  across risk deciles, and hence 
our support for hypothesis 2a and 2b. 
A possible problem with the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) regression of the standard 
pecking order (8) is the assumption that the financing deficit is exogenous. The 
assumption however is not ad hoc, it is motivated by theory. The standard pecking order 
and also our theory, argues that the capital structure decision is driven by the fact the 
external markets are imperfectly informed about a firm’s future use of capital. The key 
friction therefore is that the firm has to contact an imperfectly informed market. The 
reason why the firm has a net requirement for external finance should not matter 
according to the theory. 
We perform a series of robustness checks. We test for correlation of residuals across 
firms and time, we include the set of conventional leverage variables, we consider 
different time periods and pre-rank firms using other controls for risk, such as age and 
size, and the market to book ratio. We find that our hypotheses are robust. 
                                                 
8 As noted by Frank and Goyal (2003), running a level regression in first-differences increases standard 
errors and biases the estimators towards zero. But similar to their findings, we find that this possible bias is 
not large enough to render our estimates statistically insignificant. 
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Data 
Sample construction 
We study a large, unbalanced panel of all firms from the merged CRSP-Compustat 
(CCM) database from 1971 to 2001. Our sample only starts in 1971 since we mostly use 
statement of cash flows data. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), 
regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), and firms involved in major mergers and 
acquisitions (Compustat footnote code AB). Furthermore, we exclude firm/year 
observations that report statement of cash flows data using format code (item 318) 4 or 6 
(both undefined by Compustat) and 5 (for the Canadian file) or if the format code is 
missing. 
To be able to link Compustat reliably to CRSP data we use only records with link type 
‘LC', 'LN', 'LO', 'LS', 'LU' or ’LX’. A small number of CRSP securities that link into 
more than one Compustat firm have also been deleted. 
In order to remove outliers and misrecorded data, we remove observations that have 
missing values or variables that are in the extreme 0.5 % left or right tail of the 
distribution (see the appendix for the list of variables used for trimming). To ensure that 
the sample does not contain equity issues due to IPOs, we exclude observations for the 
year in which a firm’s stock price becomes first available in the CRSP database.9 The 
maximum number of observations in our sample then is 103,429. 
                                                 
9 In fact the sample will contain only contain firms that have been publicly traded for at least 1.5 years 
since in addition to the exclusion of IPO years, our measure of past asset risk requires a firm’s stock price 
data from the previous calendar year (which may overlap with a firm’s fiscal year up to 6 months, see also 
footnote 10). 
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Construction of past asset risk variable 
The key variable in our analysis is the measure of a firm’s past asset risk. This is our 
measure of the extent to which uninformed outside investors care about not knowing 
value relative to risk, i.e. it is a proxy for the ratio r. 
The measure for a firm i in year t is constructed as follows. We first calculate the daily 
market value of firm i’s assets for each trading day in the previous calendar year.10 The 
market value of assets is defined as in Fama and French (2002). It is the book value of 
debt plus the market value of equity. The book value of debt is total liabilities (#181) plus 
preferred stock (#10, #56 or #130 depending on availability and in that order).11 The daily 
market value of equity is the number of common shares outstanding times the closing 
share price, both from CRSP. We then calculated daily returns to control for size and then 
compute the standard deviation of the daily returns over the trading days in the previous 
calendar year. If there are less than 90 days of stock price data, the firm/year observation 
is deleted from the sample. 
Our measure of asset risk has two distinct advantages. First of all, its use is directly 
motivated by theory. This is not the case for other possible proxies for risk. For example 
it is not clear how exactly the volatility of earnings (Titman and Wessels (1988)) or the 
size of a firm (Fama and French (2002)) matter for capital structure. Second, it is a 
precise measure of asset risk based on many observations over a limited period. Rajan 
                                                 
10 There is an issue concerning the overlap or gap between the calendar year used for stock price data and 
the fiscal year used for financial data. This overlap or gap exists for 48% of all firms. We check the 
robustness of our results by using only firms whose fiscal year is the calendar year. The results are 
qualitatively the same. 
11 We also try the definition of Baker and Wurgler (2001), which excludes convertible debt (#79), and also 
try using just total liabilities (#181). The result is not affected. 
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and Zingales (1995) for example do not consider risk because “there are too few 
observations to get a meaningful measure of earnings volatility. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows balance sheets, cash flows and other descriptive statistics for our sample at 
various moments in time. 
 
Table 1: Balance sheets, cash flows and other descriptive statistics over time 
 
Panel A presents average common-size balance sheets for a number of years. We confirm 
the observation of Frank and Goyal (2003) that the assets side changes somewhat over 
time whereas the liability side is relatively stable. Cash, inventories and tangibles (net 
property plant and equipment) decline over the years, intangibles increase. 
Our empirical specification in (8) uses the financing deficit as the dependent variable. 
The financing deficit itself is an aggregation of corporate cash flows. Panel B presents the 
common-size average of these cash flows and how they are financed at various moments 
in time.12 
The key observation is that equity plays an important role in financing the deficit. This 
observation contradicts the standard argument that most external financing uses debt. 
Note also the difference between the mean and the median of net debt and equity issues. 
The median is zero for both. Most firms appear to stay out of the market for external 
                                                 
12 The table confirms that dividends are a disappearing use of corporate cash flows (see Fama and French 
(2001) and also Baker and Wurgler (2003)). A comparison of the average and the median dividend 
indicates that most firms stop paying dividends and that those who continue paying them, nevertheless 
reduce the amount paid. 
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finance most of the time, but if they do seek external finance, the magnitude is large 
relative to the firm size. 
Our cash flow numbers are more moderate than those documented by Frank and Goyal 
(2003). The average financing deficit and the average net equity issue are roughly one 
half of what they report. The difference results from having a more restricted sample due 
to the fact that our firms are publicly traded for at least 1.5 years when they enter the 
sample. 
Panel C provides other descriptive statistics. The average firm becomes older and larger. 
Note that this contradicts Frank and Goyal’s explanation of their finding that the standard 
pecking order appears to not work well in the 90s. 
Analysis 
The original pecking order 
We argued that the original pecking order is an extreme and should therefore not work 
well for a large sample of firms. The following is the result of running regression (8) on 
the full sample (standard error in brackets). 
 
    (0.000)    (0.002)
ˆ 0.004 0.375it itD DEF∆ = − +   
The R2 is 0.36. The coefficient on financing deficit is much less than the 0.75 (R2 of 0.68) 
originally reported by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and confirmed by Frank and 
Goyal (2003) on a subsample of firms with continuous reporting from 1971 to 1989. 
Our coefficient is larger than the 0.28 (R2 of 0.14) and 0.15 (R2 of 0.22) reported by 
Frank and Goyal using an unbalanced panel from 1971-89 and 1990-98 respectively. We 
 - 19 - 
therefore confirm the criticism of Frank and Goyal, albeit in a more moderate form due to 
our more restrictive sample, that the support for the original pecking order in Shyam-
Sunder and Myers does not carry over to a broader sample of firms. There is an important 
difference between our and Frank and Goyal’s criticism. We explained why the standard 
pecking order should not work well for all firms, especially young and small ones. Frank 
and Goyal however expect the pecking order to work best for those firms since they 
should have the most severe asymmetric information problem. 
Ranking by asset risk 
In order to test our hypothesis 1 and 2, we rank firms each year into deciles according to 
their asset volatility in the previous year. Table 2 shows balance sheets, cash flows and 
other descriptive statistics across risk deciles. 
 
Table 2: Balance sheets, cash flows and other descriptive statistics across risk deciles 
 
Firms in higher risk deciles have a lot more cash on their balance sheet (panel A). The 
differences in tangibles (net property, plant and equipment) and intangibles are small. As 
far as liabilities are concerned, firms in higher risk deciles have roughly the same amount 
of short-term and less long-term debt compared to firms in lower risk deciles. 
Comparing cash flows across deciles reveals a hump shaped pattern for dividends and 
internal cash flows (panel B). The median internal cash flow in the highest decile is larger 
than in the lowest decile (not shown in the table). Firms in the top 5 risk deciles invest 
more as a percentage of their book assets than firms in the bottom 5 risk deciles. 
The average financing deficit of firms in higher risk deciles increases strongly, but the 
median financing deficit remains close to zero except for the three highest deciles. 
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Similarly, average net debt and equity issues both increase for firms in higher risk 
deciles, although the increase is more dramatic for equity than for debt. Their medians 
however are mostly zero. This again indicates that firms are reluctant to contact the 
external capital market, but if they do raise external capital, the size of the interventions 
is large. 
Firms in higher risk deciles are younger, smaller and have higher market-to-book ratio 
(panel C). Profitability, credit ratings and modified Altman’s z-scores first increase and 
then decrease across risk deciles. Firms in higher risk deciles are therefore not necessarily 
less profitable or more likely to go bankrupt than firms in lower risk deciles. 
To sum up, firms in higher risk deciles are younger, smaller, have a higher market to 
book ratio, have more cash, less long-term debt and issue more debt and more equity to 
finance larger deficits. They are however not less profitable or more likely to go 
bankrupt. 
The central result 
Table 3 contains the central result of our paper. It shows the results from running 
regressions (8) and (10) in each risk decile.13 
 
Table 3: The standard and the reverse pecking order across risk deciles 
 
The table confirms hypothesis 1 that the standard pecking should well in lowest risk 
decile. The coefficient on the financing deficit in the lowest risk decile is 0.87 (R2= 0.85). 
                                                 
13 The table reports OLS standard errors. We also computed Newey-West standard errors that correct for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. They are about three to four times larger and thus do not change 
the statistical significance of our results. 
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This is considerably larger than the 0.75 obtained by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
and by Frank and Goyal (2003) when they look for the strongest support for the original 
pecking order. 
To illustrate the support for our hypothesis 2a and 2b, we depict the coefficients on the 
financing deficit and the associated R2 from table 3 in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The standard and the reverse pecking order across risk deciles 
 
The figure shows that the standard (reverse) pecking order works monotonically worse 
(better) as we move towards higher risk deciles.14 
To get an idea of the economic significance of past asset risk, consider the impact of a 
one standard deviation change (9.3% of book assets) from the mean deficit (0.5% of book 
assets) on net debt issues in the lowest risk decile. They increase from 0.4% to 8.5% of 
book assets. In the highest risk decile, a one standard deviation change from the mean 
deficit increases net debt issues from 1.8% to 5.5% of book assets. 
As alternative to running regression (8) in each decile, we can also run the following 
variation on the entire sample: 
 1*it it it it itD a bDEF cDEF RISK ε−∆ = + + +  (12) 
The results is as follows (standard errors in brackets) 
                                                 
14 Note that the estimated intercept is close to zero across all risk deciles. This suggests that there is no 
factor that is common to all firms in a risk decile throughout the sample period that could explain the 
pattern of net debt issues. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients on the deficit from the net debt and the 
net equity regressions add up to one across deciles. This indicates that the statement of cash flows data is 
accurate. 
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 1
               (0.000)    (0.002)              (0.036)
ˆ 0.004 0.518 3.509 *it it it itD DEF DEF RISK −∆ = − + −  (13) 
The result confirms that firms with a higher asset risk in the previous year have a lower 
coefficient on the deficit. 
We therefore conclude that the data supports our hypothesis 1 and 2. First, the standard 
pecking order works well in describing the time series of debt financing for those firms 
that have the lowest asset risk. In fact, the pecking order performs better for those firms 
than in Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ subsample of 157 firms. Second, the coefficient on the 
financing deficit of the standard pecking order regression (8) decreases monotonically as 
one increases the asset risk of firms. 
Robustness 
Fama-McBeth regression 
In order to address the potential problem of cross-sectional correlation in a pooled panel 
regression such as ours, we follow Fama and French (2002) and use the Fama-McBeth 
procedure (Fama and McBeth (1973)). The procedure consist of running a cross-sectional 
regression for each decile/year combination, average the cross-sectional coefficient 
estimates  for each decile and use the time-series standard deviations of the cross-
sectional estimates to estimate the standard error of the average estimate. Table 4 shows 
the results of performing the Fama-McBeth procedure when running regression (8) across 
risk deciles. 
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Table 4: The standard pecking order across risk deciles: Fama-McBeth procedure 
 
The Fama-McBeth procedure confirms our hypothesis 1. The standard pecking order 
works best for the lowest risk decile. The procedure also reconfirms our hypothesis 2. 
The pecking order works monotonically worse for higher risk deciles.15 
Including conventional leverage variables 
According to hypothesis 3, our hypothesis 2 and 3 should still hold if we add 
conventional determinants of leverage to the deficit as exogenous variables and run 
regression (11). 
First we run regression (11) without the deficit on the entire sample (not reported) to 
confirm that the conventional leverage variables enter the regression all with the usual 
sign: positive on tangibility and sales, negative on the market to book ratio and 
profitability. Although running a level regression in first-differences biases the estimator 
towards zero, all coefficients are statistically significant. Next we run the same regression 
without the deficit across in each risk deciles to see whether the coefficients on the 
conventional variables are stable across risk deciles. 
 
Table 5: Regression of net debt issues on conventional variables across risk deciles 
 
                                                 
15 We also analyzed the autocorrelation in the time series of the cross-sectional estimates. The first-order 
autocorrelation is sometimes as large as 0.8. Sometimes it is statistically insignificant from zero. We could 
follow Fama and French (2002) and correct for this by inflating our standard errors by a factor 2.5. But this 
does not affect our result that the coefficient on the deficit and the explanatory power decrease 
monotonically across risk deciles. 
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Except for the coefficient on tangibility in some deciles, all coefficients are statistically 
significant and have the usual sign across all deciles.16 The patter of change of the 
coefficients across deciles is noteworthy. The positive relationship between sales and net 
debt issues weakens in higher risk deciles. This is not surprising since sales are an 
imperfect proxy for risk. Similarly, the strengthening of the positive relationship between 
tangibility and net debt issues in higher risk deciles indicates that collateral is more 
important for riskier firms. 
The negative relationship between the market-to-book ratio and net debt issues also 
weakens in higher risk deciles. This is surprising since the standard interpretation of the 
negative relationship is either that high market-to-book firms have large growth options 
and are therefore subject to the debt overhang problem (Myers (1977)), or that firms issue 
more equity when their market-to-book ratio is high indicating market timing (Baker and 
Wurgler (2001)). One would expect both explanations to be more relevant for riskier 
firms but this is not the case. 
Lastly, the weakening of the negative relationship between profits and net debt issues can 
be seen as weak support for our hypothesis 2. The negative relationship between profits 
and debt is usually interpreted using the standard pecking order. The argument is that 
more profitable firms can finance investments internally and therefore avoid the adverse 
selection problem of outside finance altogether. We showed that for firms with a higher 
asset risk, it is equity and not debt that comes second after internal cash in the pecking 
order of financing. 
To test our hypothesis 3, we run the specification (11) in each risk decile. 
                                                 
16 The R2 is very low because (among other things) running the conventional leverage regression in first 
differences magnifies problems with measurement errors in variables. 
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Table 6: Regression of net debt issues on conventional variables and the financing 
deficit across risk deciles 
 
Table 6 shows that the inclusion of conventional leverage variables does not affect the 
pattern of the coefficients on the financing deficit. 
Is it“risk” or just another well known empirical artifact? 
The descriptive statics of our sample sorted into risk deciles showed that firms in higher 
deciles are smaller (see table 2). Firm size is often showed to be empirically important 
determinant for various corporate variables; moreover, it has also been used as a proxy 
for firm risk (for example in Fama and French (2002). Size however also captures other 
effects such as bargaining power or reputation that are important for outside financing. 
Since our measure is a more direct measure of risk and theoretically motivated, we check 
whether our hypothesis 2 and 3 still hold if we control for firm size. We first rank firms 
by size and then by asset risk. To ease the presentation of the results we use quintiles 
instead of deciles and therefore run regression (8) in 25 size-asset risk subsamples. The 
results are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: The standard pecking order across size and risk quintiles 
 
Figure 2 plots the coefficient on the financing deficit as a function of the asset risk in 
each size group. 
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Figure 2: The standard pecking order across size and risk quintile 
 
Our results do not change. The standard pecking order still works best in the lowest asset 
risk quintile and there is still the monotonic negative relationship between the coefficient 
on the financing deficit and asset risk. 
Except for the lowest size quintile the coefficient on the financing deficit is between 0.83 
and 0.87 in the lowest risk quintile. This does not support the argument of Frank and 
Goyal (2003) that the pecking order works less well for smaller firms. Even for the 
lowest size quintile, our coefficient in the lowest risk decile is 0.50 which is well above 
their 0.16 (see their table 6). 
The negative relationship between the coefficient on the financing deficit and asset risk is 
stronger for smaller firms (except in the smallest size quintile). This indicates that our 
model has most bite for medium sized firms. 
The descriptive statistics in table 2 also shows that firms in higher deciles are younger. 
Although we are not aware of any study that uses age as a variable explaining capital 
structure, it is reasonable to think of firm age as an imperfect proxy for firm risk similar 
to firm size. We therefore repeat the above robustness check and now sort firms first by 
age and then by asset risk. Table 8 shows that the results are very similar to the sorting by 
size. 
 
Table 8: The standard pecking order across age and risk quintile 
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Figure 3 plots the coefficient on the financing deficit as a function of asset risk in each 
age group. 
 
Figure 3: The standard pecking order across age and risk quintile 
 
Again, we see that for all age groups, the standard pecking still works best in the lowest 
risk decile. Moreover, in each age group we observe the monotonic negative relationship 
between the coefficient on the deficit and asset risk. The difference across age groups is 
that the coefficient is lower and the negative relationship is stronger for younger firms. 
Are the results valid only for a specific period? 
Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that the result of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is not 
only driven by the requirement of having data with no reporting gaps but also by the time 
period they consider, i.e. 1971-1989. In a subsample of firm with no reporting gaps from 
1990-1998, Frank and Goyal find only weak support for the pecking order. The 
coefficient on the financing deficit drops to 0.33. If they allow for reporting gaps, it drops 
even further to 0.15. 
We examine whether the sample period matters for our results. In particular, we ask: is 
the support for hypothesis 1 and 2 different in the 1970s, 1980s or 1990s? Table 9 shows 
the results from running (8) across risk deciles in each decade separately. Figure 4 plots 
the estimated coefficients on the financing deficit. 
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Table 9: Pecking order across risk deciles in the 70s, 80s and 90s 
 
Figure 4: Pecking order across risk deciles in the 70s, 80s and 90s 
 
The standard pecking order still works best in lowest risk (or second lowest) decile. The 
coefficient drops only from 0.916 in the 1970s to 0.829 in the 1990s. This is very 
different from the coefficient of 0.15 found by Frank and Goyal for all firms during the 
1990s. Once we recognize that the standard pecking order should only work well for 
firms with the lowest asset risk, we do not find support for the claim that the standard 
pecking order is driven by the 1970s. 
The monotonic negative relationship between the coefficient on the financing deficit and 
asset risk is present in all decades. Note that it grows stronger as we look at more recent 
decades. 
Alternative explanation: market timing? 
The descriptive statistics across asset risk deciles (table 2) show that firms in higher risk 
deciles have a higher market to book ratio. A possible alternative explanation for the 
equity issuance of riskier firms is that those firms time the equity market, i.e. they issue 
equity when their market valuation is high (Baker and Wurgler (2002)). 
Our result however was not that firms in higher risk deciles issue more equity per se, but 
that they issue more equity to finance their deficit. In other words, these firms have a 
legitimate need for external capital. If market timing were the only explanation, then the 
firms in higher risk deciles should issue equity irrespective of their need for external 
capital. This is clearly not the case. 
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Moreover, the median net equity issue across deciles is zero (or close to zero). This 
indicates that firms contact the equity market rarely. Under market timing, we would 
expect firms in the highest risk decile, i.e. those with the highest market to book ratio, to 
issue equity more frequently. Under market timing, one could also expect undervalued 
firms, i.e. firms with low market to book ratios, to repurchase equity. This does not 
happen either. 
There are other indications that market timing cannot explain our results.17 First of all, 
firms in higher risk deciles also issue more debt. This is inconsistent with firms’ equity 
being overvalued, unless for some reason, debt is overvalued too. Second, the regression 
of net debt issues on conventional leverage variables (table 5) does not support market 
timing. The regression showed that the negative relationship between net debt issues and 
the market-to-book ratio weakens in higher risk deciles. 
To control for the market-to-book ratio, we rank firms first by their market-to-book ratio 
and then by asset risk. Again, we use quintiles to ease the presentation of the results in 
Table 10 and figure 5. 
 
Table 10: The standard pecking order across market-to-book and risk quintiles 
 
Figure 5: The standard pecking order across market-to-book and risk quintiles 
 
The result of controlling for the market to book ratio is very similar to the result of 
controlling for size or age. The standard pecking order still works best in the lowest risk 
                                                 
17 Frank and Goyal (2003b) find that stock market conditions matter but that the effect is not very strong. 
They also find that when the market as a whole rises, firms increase their leverage. 
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quintile. The coefficient on the financing deficit is above 0.80, except in the highest 
market-to-book quintile. The negative monotone relationship between the coefficient on 
the financing deficit and asset risk for all market to book quintiles, but it is strongest for 
firms with medium market-to-book ratios. 
Alternative explanation: variation in debt capacity? 
In this section we will consider the argument that if one “augments” the standard pecking 
order using the notion of “debt capacity”, it is also possible to explain our results. The 
argument is that firms in higher asset risk deciles have a lower debt capacity and 
therefore issue more equity. We challenge this argument on several grounds. 
First of all, there is no theoretical justification for such an augmentation of the adverse 
selection logic. Theories of debt capacity, so called trade-off theories of leverage, are 
outside the adverse selection paradigm (see also the classification of capital structure 
theories in Harris and Raviv (1991)). The basic trade-off hypothesis states that the level 
of leverage is determined by trading off the tax benefit of debt against the cost of 
financial distress (see for example the account given by Myers (1984)). Hence, firms with 
a high present value of tax benefits and/or a low present value of distress costs have a 
high debt capacity. Another classic explanation of debt capacity is Myers (1977) agency 
cost of debt, the debt-overhang problem. Firms with valuable growth options and existing 
debt face the problem that the return of an extra unit of capital raised goes first to the 
existing debt-holders. The provider of the extra unit of capital bears the full cost but is 
only paid after the debt is serviced. 
But since these concepts of debt capacity have little in common with the adverse 
selection logic of the pecking order, combining them in empirical studies often seems ad-
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hoc. For example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) argue that “if costs of financial 
distress are serious, the firm will consider issuing equity to finance real investments or 
pay down debt”.18 Lemmon and Zender (2002) take up this statement by saying “this […] 
suggests that costs of adverse selection are dominant for moderate capital structures but 
that tradeoff theory forces become primary motivators of capital structure at the 
extremes. We take an agnostic view, assuming that such debt levels exist for each firm 
but do not seek to specify then underlying determinants of debt capacity” 
Our approach keeps the logical purity and simplicity of the original adverse selection 
logic that drives the standard pecking order. In fact, we could reinterpret our model in 
terms of an information based debt capacity. If there is little asymmetric information 
about risk relative to value then the debt capacity of investment opportunities is high. If 
the is a lot of asymmetric information about risk relative to value, then their debt capacity 
is low. 
Besides being theoretically unappealing, our empirical evidence offers little support for 
augmenting the standard pecking order with a trade-off view of debt capacity. When we 
compared balance sheets and cash-flows across risk deciles (table 2), we found that firms 
in higher risk deciles issue more debt (but they issue even more equity). Moreover, the 
level of long-term debt relative to book assets decreases in higher risk deciles. This 
suggests that firms in higher risk deciles do not have extreme levels of leverage. Neither 
profits nor the probability of bankruptcy vary monotonically across risk deciles. This 
suggests that the trade-off between the tax benefit and the distress cost of debt cannot 
account for the monotonic pattern of the coefficient on the financing deficit in figure 3. 
                                                 
18 Graham (2000) and Lemmon and Zender (2001) find that a large fraction of firms seem to forgo large tax 
benefits associated with debt financing. At the same time, there is little evidence of sizable bankruptcy 
costs. 
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Finally, the proportion of tangibles (property, plant and equipment) and intangibles 
relative to assets is roughly constant across risk deciles. Together with the weakening of 
the negative relationship between changes in the market-to-book ratio (usually taken as a 
proxy for growth options) and net debt issues in table 5, this shows little support for the 
debt overhang view of debt capacity. 
Conclusion 
The starting point for our analysis is the empirical puzzle that the pecking order seems to 
work well when it should not, i.e. for large mature firms, and seems not to work well 
when it should, i.e. for small young nonpayers of dividends. 
We argue that the original pecking order is an extreme when there is only asymmetric 
information about value. Our model illustrates how considering asymmetric information 
about both, value and risk, transforms the adverse selection logic into a theory of debt 
and equity. The main prediction is that firms issue more equity and less debt if there is 
more asymmetric information about risk relative to value. If small young nonpayers of 
dividends (our high risk firms) face more asymmetric information about risk relative to 
value than large mature firms, our model offers an explanation of the initial puzzle. 
To test our prediction in more detail, we follow the empirical strategy of Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) who propose to test the standard pecking 
using a pooled panel regression of changes in debt on the financing deficit. The argument 
is that the original pecking order predicts that firms issue debt whenever their internal 
cash flows are insufficient to finance real investments (and other uses of funds such as 
dividends). 
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The key to our analysis is that we test the comparative statics of our theory by ranking 
firms in deciles according to their past asset risk. The argument is that an investor worries 
a lot more about not knowing the risk relative to the value of an investment if the firm 
that approaches him has had volatile assets in the recent past. The past asset risk is 
computed as the standard deviation of the daily market return on assets over the calendar 
year prior to a debt or equity issue. We use daily stock price data from CRSP in order to 
obtain a measure for risk that is more precise than proxies such as size or the volatility of 
earnings. 
The combination of a risk augmented adverse selection logic of capital structure and a 
precise measure of risk allows us, to document for the first time (to our knowledge) a 
convincing impact of risk on capital structure. 
We confirm the robustness of our results in a number of ways. First of all, we test a series 
of hypothesis. If our model is misspecified and/or if our theory is wrong, we argue that it 
would be very difficult to find a source or misspecification that delivers the same 
comparative statics as our (now supposedly incorrect) model. Other robustness checks 
include testing for correlation of residuals across firms and time, including the set of 
conventional leverage variables from trade-off theories, considering different time 
periods and using other controls for risk. 
Appendix 
Variable definitions 
Investments: For firms reporting under formats 1 to 3, it equals Compustat Item#128 + 
#113 + #129 + #219 - #107 - #109. For firms reporting under format 7, investments equal 
#128 + #113 + #129 - #107 - #109 - #309 - #310. 
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Change in net working capital: For firms reporting under format 1, it equals Compustat 
Item#274 - #236 - #301. For firms reporting under format 2and 3, it equals #274 + #236 - 
#301, and for firms reporting under format 7, it equals  - #302 - #303 - #304 - #305 - 
#307 + #274 - #312 - #301. 
Internal cash flows: For firms reporting under formats 1 to 3, it equals Compustat 
Item#123 + #124 + #125 + #126 + #106 + #213 + #217 + #218. For firms reporting under 
format 7, internal cash flows equal #123 + #124 + #125 + #126 + #106 + #213 + #217 + 
#314. 
Variables using in trimming 
In order to remove outliers and extremely misrecorded data, observations that are in the 
extreme 0.5 % left or right tail of the distribution or have missing values are removed. 
This trimming has been applied to the following variables: current assets (Compustat 
item #4), current liabilities (#5), cash dividends(#127), investments(defined above), 
internal cash flows(defined above), change in net working capital(defined above), 
financial deficit, net debt issued(#111-#114), net equity issued(#108-#115), all as a 
percentage of total assets, as well as tangibility(#8/#6), market-to-book ratio, 
profitability(#13/#6), and log(sales)(natural logarithm of #12). 
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Table 1 
Balance sheets, cash flows and other descriptive statistics over time 
The table reports average balance sheets for our sample. Financial firms, utilities and companies that could not be 
matched properly with CRSP are excluded. Unless labeled as median, each item in Panel A and Panel B is calculated as 
a percentage of the book value of total assets and then averaged across each firm of our sample in that year. 
Year 1971 1980 1990 2001 
Number of observations 1518 2925 3481 3810 
Panel A: Balance sheet items 
Assets:     
+Cash (#162) 0.040 0.030 0.085 0.127 
+Short term investments (#193) 0.035 0.045 0.031 0.056 
+Receivables-total (#2) 0.194 0.217 0.205 0.154 
+Inventories (#3) 0.247 0.245 0.186 0.126 
+Current assets-other (#68) 0.014 0.020 0.029 0.037 
+Current assets-total (#4) 0.539 0.575 0.544 0.501 
+Net property plant and equipment (#8) 0.356 0.349 0.320 0.276 
+Investments and advances - equity method (#31) 0.020 0.014 0.010 0.010 
+Investments and advances - other (#32) 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.020 
+Intangibles (#33) 0.036 0.020 0.049 0.128 
+Assets - other (#69) 0.024 0.023 0.054 0.064 
=Total assets (#6) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Liabilities     
+Debt in current liabilities (#34) 0.068 0.066 0.094 0.063 
+Account payable (#70) 0.090 0.114 0.111 0.086 
+Income taxes payable (#71) 0.020 0.018 0.008 0.006 
+Current liabilities - other (#72) 0.061 0.087 0.097 0.118 
=Current liabilities - total (#5) 0.239 0.286 0.312 0.274 
+Long-term debt - total (#9) 0.199 0.200 0.192 0.184 
+Liabilities - other (#75) 0.012 0.015 0.034 0.045 
+Deferred taxes and ITC (#35) 0.020 0.026 0.020 0.016 
+Minority interest (#38) 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.005 
=Liabilities - total (#181) 0.476 0.529 0.564 0.524 
+Preferred stock - carrying value (#130) 0.011 0.009 0.015 0.021 
+Common equity - total (#60) 0.513 0.461 0.422 0.456 
=Stockholders' equity - total (#216)=(#130)+(#60) 0.524 0.471 0.437 0.476 
=Total liabilities and stockholders' equity  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Panel B: Corporate cash flows 
+Cash Dividends (#127) 0.018 0.015 0.009 0.005 
+Change in net working capital19 0.022 0.024 -0.011 -0.022 
-Internal cash flow1 0.099 0.106 0.044 0.000 
+Investments1 0.082 0.102 0.071 0.058 
=Financial deficit (Mean) 0.023 0.034 0.025 0.041 
Financial deficit (Median) 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.002 
Net debt issues (#111-#114) Mean 0.012 0.017 0.004 0.001 
Net debt issues (Median) 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Net equity issues (#108-#115)  (Mean) 0.011 0.017 0.021 0.040 
Net equity issues (Median) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Panel C: Other descriptive statistics 
Age (years since first appearance in CRSP) 7 11 12 13 
Market value of assets20 (in millions of dollars) 503.233 464.232 966.102 2943.950 
Book value of assets (#6) (in millions of dollars) 436.892 514.434 858.079 1550.136 
Tangibility (#8/#6) 0.356 0.349 0.320 0.276 
Log sales (log(#12)) 4.73 4.74 4.45 5.25 
Market-to-book ratio 1.52 1.40 1.54 1.90 
Profitability=Operating income(#13) /  Assets(/#6) 0.128 0.144 0.065 0.014 
 
                                                 
19 Definitions follow Frank and Goyal (2003). See appendix for details. 
20 Equals book value of debt plus market value of equity. Definitions follow Fama and French (2002). 
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Table2 
Balance sheets, cash flows and other descriptive statistics across risk deciles 
The table reports average balance sheets, cash flow items and other descriptive statistics for each risk decile. Firms are ranked in deciles according to daily standard deviation of 
the market value of assets (book value of debt + market value of equity) in the previous calendar year. Rank 10 firms have highest standard deviation. Unless labeled as median, 
each item is calculated as a percentage of the book value of total assets and then averaged across all firms in a risk decile.  
Risk decile 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Risky) 
Number of observations 10426 10331 10340 10332 10336 10335 10338 10334 10337 10320 
Panel A: Balance sheet items 
Assets:           
+Cash (#162) 0.039 0.034 0.039 0.045 0.051 0.064 0.076 0.091 0.107 0.124 
+Short term investments (#193) 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.034 0.042 0.055 0.070 0.082 0.082 
+Receivables-total (#2) 0.182 0.189 0.195 0.197 0.201 0.204 0.210 0.208 0.203 0.184 
+Inventories (#3) 0.191 0.205 0.210 0.208 0.205 0.202 0.195 0.188 0.176 0.157 
+Current assets-other (#68) 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.026 
+Current assets-total (#4) 0.474 0.483 0.505 0.515 0.532 0.551 0.578 0.602 0.614 0.592 
+Net property plant and equipment (#8) 0.369 0.367 0.356 0.351 0.340 0.322 0.301 0.281 0.267 0.268 
+Investments and advances - equity method (#31) 0.020 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.011 
+Investments and advances - other (#32) 0.040 0.024 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.030 
+Intangibles (#33) 0.052 0.061 0.059 0.057 0.055 0.054 0.050 0.043 0.043 0.050 
+Assets - other (#69) 0.050 0.048 0.045 0.044 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.043 0.044 0.051 
=Total assets (#6) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Liabilities           
+Debt in current liabilities (#34) 0.098 0.077 0.069 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.067 0.065 0.064 0.074 
+Account payable (#70) 0.119 0.108 0.104 0.102 0.101 0.102 0.100 0.096 0.098 0.106 
+Income taxes payable (#71) 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.008 
+Current liabilities - other (#72) 0.090 0.092 0.093 0.093 0.095 0.095 0.096 0.095 0.097 0.096 
=Current liabilities - total (#5) 0.321 0.290 0.280 0.274 0.275 0.275 0.277 0.269 0.270 0.285 
+Long-term debt - total (#9) 0.304 0.270 0.239 0.217 0.193 0.172 0.151 0.131 0.112 0.098 
+Liabilities - other (#75) 0.068 0.047 0.037 0.029 0.024 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.014 
+Defered taxes and ITC (#35) 0.024 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.008 
+Minority interest (#38) 0.010 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
=Liabilities - total (#181) 0.724 0.641 0.588 0.550 0.519 0.492 0.466 0.433 0.411 0.410 
+Prefered stock - carrying value (#130) 0.017 0.013 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.016 0.017 
+Common equity - total (#60) 0.259 0.345 0.401 0.441 0.471 0.498 0.524 0.554 0.573 0.574 
=Stockholders' equity - total (#216)=(#130)+(#60) 0.276 0.359 0.412 0.450 0.481 0.508 0.534 0.567 0.589 0.591 
=Total liabilities and stockholders' equity  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Risk decile 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Risky) 
Number of observations 10426 10331 10340 10332 10336 10335 10338 10334 10337 10320 
Panel B: Corporate cash flows 
+Cash Dividends (#127) 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.004 
+Investments21 0.066 0.074 0.081 0.088 0.094 0.097 0.098 0.096 0.093 0.086 
+Change in working capital1 0.004 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.004 -0.035 
-Internal cash flow1 0.075 0.087 0.093 0.097 0.099 0.095 0.085 0.063 0.019 -0.070 
=Financial deficit (Mean) 0.005 0.008 0.012 0.017 0.022 0.030 0.042 0.060 0.085 0.125 
Financial deficit (Median) -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.014 
Net debt issues (#111-#114) (Mean) 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.018 
Net debt issues - Median -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Net equity issues (#108-#115) - Mean 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.017 0.028 0.044 0.068 0.107 
Net equity issues - Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Panel C: Other descriptive statistics 
Age (years since first appearance in CRSP) 13.7 15.3 14.7 13.5 12.1 10.7 9.4 8.3 7.2 6.6 
Market value of assets22 (in millions of dollars) 2287.082 2206.197 1896.059 1523.325 1307.745 877.455 588.056 400.242 210.674 144.904 
Book value of assets (#6) (in millions of dollars) 2468.440 1726.506 1273.871 883.251 636.009 430.103 257.375 176.327 90.361 62.547 
Tangibility (#8/#6) 0.369 0.367 0.356 0.351 0.340 0.322 0.301 0.281 0.267 0.268 
Log sales (log(#12)) 6.096 5.988 5.797 5.466 5.130 4.726 4.305 3.812 3.181 2.169 
Market-to-book ratio 1.127 1.160 1.256 1.343 1.447 1.582 1.750 1.964 2.213 2.694 
Profitability=Operating income(#13)/Assets(/#6) 0.103 0.119 0.127 0.132 0.132 0.127 0.112 0.083 0.027 -0.088 
Median S&P Domestic issuer credit rating BB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB- BB BB- B+ B+ B+ 
Median modified Z-score23 1.797 2.126 2.291 2.369 2.402 2.374 2.278 2.109 1.712 0.658 
 
                                                 
21 Definitions follow Frank and Goyal (2003). See appendix for details. 
22 Equals book value of debt plus market value of equity. Definitions follow Fama and French (2002). 
23 Z-score equals 3.3*(#170,pretax income)+(#12,sales)+1.4*(#36,retained earnings)+1.2*[(#4,current assets)-(#5,current liabilities)]/(#6,assets). 
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Table 3 
Standard and reverse pecking order across risk deciles 
Pooled panel OLS regressions of net debt issues ∆D and ∆E on the financing deficit DEF are estimated for each decile: ititit bDEFaD ε++=∆ , it it itE a bDEF ε∆ = + +   
Ranking based on the daily standard deviation of market value of firms assets during the previous calendar year. Firms with rank 10 have highest standard deviation. Standard 
errors are reported below the coefficients, in italic. All coefficients on financial deficit are significant at the 1 % level. 
Panel A: Dependent variable - Net debt issued 
rank 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Risky) 
Intercept -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
           
Financial deficit 0.868 0.822 0.807 0.764 0.708 0.570 0.457 0.326 0.230 0.147 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
           
Adjusted R squared 0.849 0.802 0.787 0.728 0.665 0.542 0.419 0.293 0.209 0.129 
Panel B: Dependent variable - Net equity issued 
rank 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Risky) 
Intercept 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
           
Financial deficit 0.126 0.175 0.192 0.235 0.291 0.430 0.542 0.673 0.770 0.853 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
           
Adjusted R squared 0.109 0.157 0.173 0.203 0.251 0.402 0.504 0.638 0.747 0.832 
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Figure 1 
Standard and reverse pecking order across risk deciles 
Pooled panel OLS regressions of net debt issues ∆D and net equity issues ∆E on the financing deficit DEF are estimated for each decile: ititit bDEFaD ε++=∆ , 
it it itE a bDEF ε∆ = + + .The figure plots coefficients on financial deficit and adjusted R-squared for each risk decile. 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1
(Safe)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(Risky)
Risk decile
Net debt issued: Coefficient on
Financial deficit
Net debt issued: Adj. R-
squared
Net equity issued: Coefficient
on Financial deficit
Net equity issued: Adj. R-
squared
 
 - 42 - 
Table 4 
The standard pecking order across risk deciles: Fama-McBeth procedure 
Firms are ranked into deciles according to daily standard deviation of market value of assets in the previous calendar year. The regression ititit bDEFaD ε++=∆ is estimated for 
each decile/year combination. The table reports, for each decile, time-series means of cross sectional regression intercepts and slopes, their time-series standard errors (in italic) 
and t-statistics. All coefficients on financial deficit are significant at the 1 % level. 
 
Risk decile 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Risky) 
           
Intercept -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
Standard Error 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
t(Mn) -6.575 -1.576 -1.129 -1.870 -3.539 -4.089 -5.214 -5.407 -4.827 -3.277 
           
Financial deficit 0.872 0.838 0.821 0.792 0.759 0.668 0.590 0.522 0.423 0.307 
Standard Error 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.023 0.034 0.040 0.049 0.050 0.044 
t(Mn) 72.570 56.658 51.779 53.221 32.862 19.494 14.940 10.611 8.537 6.962 
 
 - 43 - 
 
 
Table 5 
Regression of net debt issues on conventional variables across risk deciles. 
The regression it DEF it
TANG it MTB it PROF it LOGSALES it it
D a b DEF
b TANG b MTB b PROF b LOGSALES ε
∆ = +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
 
is estimated for each decile. ∆D is net debt issued. Tangibility is defined as property, plant & equipment over total assets. Market-to-book is defined as in Fama and French (2002). 
LogSales is the natural logarithm of net sales. Profitability is operating income before depreciation over total book value of assets. Firms are ranked into deciles according to daily 
standard deviation of market value of assets in the previous calendar year. OLS standard errors reported below the coefficients. 
 
Risk decile 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Risky) 
Intercept -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.013 0.013 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
            
∆ Tangibility 0.001 0.015 -0.088 -0.029 0.016 0.041 0.041 0.024 0.089 0.069 
  0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.011 
            
∆ Market-to-Book -0.014 -0.015 -0.012 -0.018 -0.014 -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 
  0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
            
∆ LogSales 0.058 0.094 0.099 0.073 0.068 0.063 0.049 0.034 0.022 0.021 
  0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
            
∆ Profitability -0.177 -0.319 -0.305 -0.200 -0.173 -0.138 -0.090 -0.073 -0.026 -0.011 
  0.014 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.004 
            
Adj. R-squared 0.043 0.093 0.087 0.072 0.069 0.061 0.047 0.032 0.019 0.028 
            
Number of Observations 9893 9996 10046 10023 10043 10032 10040 9959 9869 9559 
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Table 6 
Regression of net debt issues on conventional variables and financing deficit across risk deciles. 
The regression it DEF it
TANG it MTB it PROF it LOGSALES it it
D a b DEF
b TANG b MTB b PROF b LOGSALES ε
∆ = +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
 
is estimated for each decile. ∆D is net debt issued. Tangibility is defined as property, plant & equipment over total assets. Market-to-book is defined as in Fama and French (2002). 
LogSales is the natural logarithm of net sales. Profitability is operating income before depreciation over total value of assets. Firms are ranked into deciles according to daily 
standard deviation of market value of assets in the previous calendar year. OLS standard errors reported below the coefficients. 
 
Risk decile 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Risky) 
Intercept -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
            
∆ Tangibility 0.006 0.037 0.024 0.037 0.056 0.068 0.129 0.101 0.142 0.102 
  0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 
            
∆ Market-to-Book -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.009 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
            
∆ Logsales 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.015 
  0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
            
∆ Profitability -0.010 -0.017 -0.020 -0.022 -0.045 -0.031 -0.024 -0.040 -0.015 -0.003 
  0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 
            
Financial deficit 0.866 0.833 0.805 0.761 0.706 0.574 0.452 0.328 0.236 0.151 
  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 
            
Adj. R-squared 0.851 0.814 0.789 0.733 0.678 0.556 0.430 0.312 0.231 0.155 
            
Number of Observations 9893 9996 10046 10023 10043 10032 10040 9959 9869 9559 
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Table 7 
Standard pecking order across size and risk quintiles 
The regression ititit bDEFaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each size/risk group. The table reports coefficients on financial 
deficit from pecking order regressions of net debt issued on financial deficit. Firms are sorted in quintiles according to 
book assets, and then within each size quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups based on daily standard deviation of market 
value of assets during the previous calendar year. OLS standard errors reported below the coefficients in italic.   
 
Risk quintile 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 (Risky) 
Size quintile 1 (Small) 0.505 0.309 0.235 0.143 0.127 
 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 
      
Size quintile 2 0.836 0.624 0.456 0.291 0.189 
 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
      
Size quintile 3 0.866 0.771 0.676 0.490 0.265 
 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
      
Size quintile 4 0.873 0.821 0.798 0.703 0.519 
 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 
      
Size quintile 5 (Big) 0.839 0.823 0.788 0.750 0.713 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 
 
Figure 2 
Standard pecking order across size and risk quintile 
The regression ititit bDEFaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each size/risk group. Firms are sorted in quintiles according 
to book assets, and then within each size quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups based on daily standard deviation of 
market value of assets during the previous calendar year. The figure plots coefficients on financial deficit for the size 
quintiles. 
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Table 8 
Standard pecking order across age and risk quintile 
The regression ititit bDEFaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each age/risk group. The table reports coefficients on financial 
deficit from pecking order regressions of net debt issued on financial deficit. Firms are sorted in quintiles according to age 
(years since it first appeared in CRSP), and then within each age quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups based on daily 
standard deviation of market value of assets during the previous calendar year. OLS standard errors reported below the 
coefficients in italic.   
Risk quintile 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 (Risky) 
Age quintile 1 (Young) 0.771 0.615 0.374 0.250 0.155 
 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.005 
      
Age quintile 2 0.841 0.705 0.531 0.292 0.157 
 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.007 
      
Age quintile 3 0.856 0.785 0.607 0.397 0.180 
 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.007 
      
Age quintile 4 0.879 0.795 0.703 0.521 0.277 
 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 
      
Age quintile 5 (Old) 0.889 0.844 0.795 0.760 0.504 
 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.010 
 
Figure 3 
Standard pecking order across age and risk quintile 
The regression ititit bDEFaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each age/risk group. Firms are sorted in quintiles according 
to age (years since it first appeared in CRSP), and then within each age quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups based on 
daily standard deviation of market value of assets during the previous calendar year. The figure plots coefficients on 
financial deficit for the age quintiles. 
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Table 9 
Pecking order across risk deciles in the 70s, 80s and 90s 
Pooled panel OLS regressions of net debt issues ∆D on the financing deficit DEF are estimated for each decile in each period separately: ititit bDEFaD ε++=∆ . Ranking 
based on the daily standard deviation of market value of firms assets during the previous calendar year. Firms with rank 10 have highest standard deviation. OLS standard errors 
are reported below the coefficients, in italic. All coefficients on financial deficit are significant at the 1 % level. 
Panel A: 1971-1980 
Risk decile 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Risky) 
Intercept -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
           
Financial deficit 0.916 0.838 0.900 0.862 0.887 0.842 0.798 0.788 0.725 0.534 
 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.010 
           
Adj. R squared 0.880 0.861 0.898 0.848 0.869 0.847 0.789 0.781 0.709 0.504 
Panel B: 1981-1990 
Risk decile 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Risky) 
Intercept -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
           
Financial deficit 0.891 0.792 0.824 0.802 0.758 0.720 0.623 0.531 0.356 0.210 
 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008 
           
Adj. R squared 0.889 0.765 0.813 0.782 0.711 0.686 0.578 0.485 0.327 0.186 
Panel C: 1991-2001 
Risk decile 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Risky) 
Intercept -0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
           
Financial deficit 0.829 0.837 0.771 0.717 0.648 0.454 0.337 0.209 0.150 0.100 
 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 
           
Adj. R squared 0.804 0.809 0.741 0.667 0.600 0.423 0.298 0.181 0.136 0.089 
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Figure 4 
Pecking order across risk deciles in the 70s, 80s and 90s. 
Pooled panel OLS regressions of net debt issues ∆D on the financing deficit DEF are estimated for each decile in each period separately: ititit bDEFaD ε++=∆ . Ranking 
based on the daily standard deviation of market value of firms assets during the previous calendar year. Firms with rank 10 have highest standard deviation. OLS standard errors 
are reported below the coefficients, in italic. All coefficients on financial deficit are significant at the 1 % level. 
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Table 10 
Standard pecking order across market to book and risk quintiles 
The regression ititit bDEFaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each size/risk group. The table reports coefficients on financial 
deficit from pecking order regressions of net debt issued on financial deficit. Firms are sorted in quintiles according to 
market-to-book ratio  ((market value of equity+book value of debt)/book value of assets), and then within each MTB 
quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups based on daily standard deviation of market value of assets during the previous 
calendar year. OLS standard errors reported below the coefficients in italic.   
 
Risk quitile 1 (Safe) 2 3 4 5 (Risky) 
MTB quintile 1 (Low) 0.880 0.891 0.888 0.774 0.388 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.008 
      
MTB quintile 2 0.903 0.886 0.863 0.797 0.603 
 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 
      
MTB quintile 3 0.833 0.801 0.777 0.695 0.476 
 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 
      
MTB quintile 4 0.799 0.684 0.572 0.444 0.292 
 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 
      
MTB quintile 5 (High) 0.518 0.261 0.194 0.141 0.099 
 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 
 
Figure 5 
Standard pecking order across market to book and risk quintiles 
The regression ititit bDEFaD ε++=∆ is estimated for each size/risk group. Firms are sorted in quintiles according 
to market-to-book ratio ((market value of equity+book value of debt)/book value of assets), and then within each 
market-to-book quintile, firms are ranked in 5 groups based on daily standard deviation of market value of assets 
during the previous calendar year. The figure plots coefficients on financial deficit for the market-to-book quintiles. 
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